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Abstract 
Observed spatial wage disparities reflect not only disparities in regional productivity but also an 
uneven geographical distribution of heterogeneous worker skills. We measure spatial skill disparities 
in Japan and evaluate how migration contributes to these disparities. For this purpose, we regress the 
individual wage on the residential region dummy variables and a series of individual characteristics 
to decompose the wage into regional productivity and the workers’ skills. The estimation illustrates 
that by removing the skill heterogeneities, the productivity disparity is approximately half of the 
observed wage disparity. Workers living in metropolitan areas have 9.7% higher skills than those in 
nonmetropolitan areas on average. The spatial skill disparity that stems from individuals’ hometowns 
is approximately 4.2%. Hence, migration increases the spatial skill disparity from 4.2% to 9.7%, 
which is an increase of 5.5 percentage points. Furthermore, we investigate migration effects in terms 
of the workers’ characteristics and find that most sorting effects of migration come from highly 
educated and regularly employed male workers.  
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1  Introduction 
Understanding the interregional productivity gap is one of the main issues in the field of urban 
and regional economics. Agglomeration economies have been considered a critical source of the 
interregional productivity gap, and many studies estimate the degree of agglomeration economies 
using the mean wage observed in each region as an indicator of regional productivity.
1
 However, 
workers are heterogeneous in their skills, and the heterogeneous skills are unevenly distributed over 
geographical space. Furthermore, the regional mean wage is determined by the composition of 
heterogeneous workers and by the regional productivity. Thus, spatial skill disparities may cause 
significant bias in the degree of agglomeration economies. Many studies, such as those by Yankow 
(2006), Combes et al. (2008), Bacolod et al. (2009), De la Roca (2011), and Matano and Naticchioni 
(2012), demonstrate that highly skilled workers tend to agglomerate to large cities. This phenomenon 
is referred to as “spatial skill sorting”. High wages in large cities may reflect not only high 
productivity premiums in the cities but also the concentration of highly skilled workers. This paper 
investigates the degree to which such spatial sorting increases spatial wage disparities. 
There are two sources of spatial sorting. First, individuals bred in larger cities tend to acquire 
more skills. This effect can be identified using information about workers’ hometowns. Second, 
migration also generates interregional differences in skills because migration changes the 
composition of heterogeneous workers in the regions. This paper quantifies these two sources of 
spatial sorting using Japanese individual-level data. Few papers have analyzed the effect of 
migration on spatial skill disparities based on a comparison of skill distributions with and without 
migration. To our knowledge, no such studies have been conducted in Japan.
2
  
In our empirical strategy, we first estimate the wage equation using residential region dummy 
variables and individual characteristics. Then, we decompose individuals’ wages into regional 
productivity and individual skills that are embedded in the individual. To evaluate the obtained 
geographical distribution of individual skills, we calculate the difference in the mean skills between 
metropolitan and nonmetropolitan areas, which is called the skill difference by residence in this 
paper. 
Second, this paper analyzes the effect of migration on spatial skill disparities. For this purpose, 
information on individuals’ residences in the counterfactual situation where there is no migration, i.e., 
hometowns, is required. We calculate the skill difference in the counterfactual situations. Through 
comparing the actual and counterfactual skill differences, we evaluate the effect of migration on skill 
sorting. To identify individuals’ hometowns, we use Japanese General Social Surveys (JGSS), which 
                                                        
1 See Rosenthal and Strange (2004). For the Japanese case, Tabuchi and Yoshida (2000) estimate the effect of 
agglomeration economies using per capita labor income in cities. 
2 Tabuchi (1988) analyzes causality between regional per capita income and interregional migration using Japanese 
prefecture-level panel data and concludes that migration does not cause regional income disparities. However, as 
prefecture-level data cannot count for worker heterogeneity between migrants and non-migrants, we analyze the 
effects of migration on spatial disparities using individual-level data.  
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are individual-level pooled cross-sectional data with information on residence at age 15. This type of 
identification of migration is based on a long-term view of migration. A typical method to identify 
the short-run migration is using information about moves during an interval of surveys of panel data. 
This method cannot generate the full effect of migration because “stayers” identified in this method 
might have originated from another region before the time of the survey. Based on long-term 
migration, Combes et al. (2012) examine the effect of migration as the source of spatial sorting using 
the information on place of birth.
3
  
This paper shows that the productivity gap is considerably smaller than the observed wage 
disparity. The average productivity gap between the Tokyo Metropolitan Area (hereafter referred to 
MA) and the other regions is 12.0%, which accounts for only 51% of the observed wage gap of 
23.4%.
4
 This statistic suggests the substantial role of spatial skill sorting on spatial wage disparities. 
Indeed, our results show that the mean worker skill level in the Tokyo MA is 9.7% higher than that 
in other regions. In the counterfactual situation without migration, the skill level difference is 4.2%, 
implying that migration increases the skill level by 5.5 percentage points. Calculating the 
counterfactual wage without migration shows that migration enlarges the spatial wage disparity by 
23.5%. 
We also explore the sorting effect of migration within specific types of workers. The sorting 
effect is relatively weak for low-educated and female worker groups, illustrating that migrants from 
non-MAs have nearly the same mean skill level as stayers in the Tokyo MA. In the case of 
non-regular employees, migration is the negative selection from both the Tokyo MA and non-MAs. 
Thus, the positive sorting effect of migration mainly comes from the migration of highly skilled 
workers, specifically, highly educated and regularly employed male workers. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the outline of our 
methodology. We specify the wage equation and define several measures of spatial disparities used 
to evaluate the sorting effect of migration. Section 3 describes our dataset. Section 4 reports the 
results. Section 5 discusses the robustness of the results. Section 6 presents more detailed analyses 
and interpretations. Section 7 provides some conclusions. 
 
 
2  Methodology 
2.1 Overview 
We consider local labor markets, each of which matches the supply and demand of specific 
                                                        
3 Because self-selecting migration occurs after age 15 in almost all cases, our concept of counterfactual skill 
disparities corresponds to the “sorting at birth” concept of Combes et al. (2012). 
4 This result is in line with the result of Combes et al. (2008), who find that worker heterogeneity accounts for 
approximately half of the observed spatial wage disparities using French panel data. Using Italian data, Mion and 
Naticchioni (2009) show that the difference in mean worker fixed effects accounts for 75% of wage differences 
between denser and less dense areas. Matano and Naticchioni (2012) derive 77-79% as the corresponding value from 
Canadian data. 
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skilled labor types in a specific region. This implies that a worker’s wage is determined by his/her 
workplace location and skills. We estimate the wage equation using individual-level data that 
identify individual characteristics and residential locations at the prefecture level.
5
 From estimated 
parameters in the wage equation, we obtain effects of residences, referred to as regional 
productivities, and individual wage-earing abilities, referred to as worker skills.  
Regional disparities in this paper are based on the comparison between MAs and non-MAs. We 
use three definitions of MAs in Japan: the Tokyo MA, three major MAs, and denser prefectures.
6
  
We first calculate the regional productivity difference to clarify whether observed wages in 
large MAs overstate the regional productivity advantages. This difference accounts for the wage 
differences in the counterfactual situation, where all regions have the same composition of worker 
skills.  
Second, to evaluate the difference in worker skill distribution, we calculate the ratio between 
the mean worker skill level in MAs and that in non-MAs, which is called the skill difference by 
residence. A positive correlation between regional productivity and regional mean skill level leads to 
positive spatial skill sorting.  
Third, we consider a counterfactual situation in which there is no migration, i.e., all workers 
work in their hometowns, as a reference point. As discussed in Section 3, the surveys used in this 
paper contain information about the residential prefecture at age 15, which is called the hometown. 
Assigning individuals to their hometowns, we calculate the ratio between the mean skill level in 
MAs and that in non-MAs, which is called the skill difference by hometown. Because this measure 
indicates the skill disparity without migration, the effect of migration is the difference between the 
skill level by residence and by hometown.  
Finally, to evaluate the effect of migration on the spatial wage disparity, we compute the 
counterfactual wage in hometown using the worker’s skill level and the prefectural productivity of 
the worker’s hometown. The comparison between actual and counterfactual wages indicates the 
contribution of migration to the spatial wage disparity.  
 
2.2 Estimation of the wage equation 
Local labor markets set the same wage for workers with the same skill in the same region. Thus, 
worker i's wage, wi, is determined by the worker’s residence r(i) and skill, si:  
               wi = w (r(i), si)                        (1) 
The regional effects on wages are elucidated by residential region dummy variables at the 
                                                        
5 We use residence as a proxy of workplace because no information on workplace location is available in the surveys 
used in the paper. 
6 The Tokyo MA is composed of Tokyo, Kanagawa, Saitama, and Chiba Prefectures. The three major MAs are the 
Tokyo MA, Osaka MA (Osaka, Kyoto, Hyogo, and Nara Prefectures) and Nagoya MA (Aichi, Gifu, and Mie 
Prefectures). Denser prefectures are prefectures with a higher population density that covers 50% of workers in the 
sample. 
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prefecture level. The worker skill represents the individual’s ability to earn wages. It is related to 
variables such as standard worker characteristics, workplace characteristics, and household 
environment. In this paper, we assume a log-linear form of wage function, expressed as 
                ,     (2) 
where  is the effect of a residence on wage, called regional productivity, and xi is the vector of 
the variables that explain workers’ wage-earning abilities. We use standard worker characteristics, 
workplace characteristics, and household variables. For standard worker characteristics, we use 
gender, education, and age. For workplace characteristics, we consider employment status, firm size, 
and industry.
7
 The employment status variables include a regular employment dummy variable. For 
household variables, we use information on a dependent spouse and/or dependent child, the main 
source of household income, and the spouse’s employment status. Because the social environment of 
the workers’ hometown may directly affect their skills, which is not captured by the above 
characteristics, we add hometown dummy variables as explanatory variables. Unobserved skills that 
are not captured by these variables are included in the error term ei. We list variables formally in the 
Appendix. 
We define worker i's skill by 
.
 
Skill si represents i's wage-earning ability that is independent of residential location.
8
 To obtain 
consistent estimators of worker skills, it is sufficient to obtain consistent estimators for regional 
effects . For this purpose, we concentrate our attention on controlling heterogeneous attributes of 
workers that are unevenly distributed over regions. 
 
2.3  Regional productivity difference 
We measure the regional productivity difference between MAs and non-MAs using estimated 
coefficients for residential region dummy variables . We calculate the ratio of mean prefectural 
productivity  in MAs and that in non-MAs, formally defined by the following expression: 
                                                        
7 In a local labor market, different industries and firms with different sizes compete with each other for labor. Thus, 
workers with the same skill level earn the same wage rate in the same region regardless of the industry and firm size. 
This is implied by the fact that we define worker “skill” as the worker’s wage-earning ability independent of 
residential regions. In this type of situation, the difference in the mean wage among industries in the same region 
evidences the difference in the mean skill among those industries.  
8 Our definition of “skill” is different from that of Mion and Naticchioni (2009) and Combes et al. (2012), who 
consider worker fixed effect to be skill level. These studies take worker fixed effect as unobserved skill level and 
discern it from observed skill levels represented by time-varying worker characteristic variables. We do not intend to 
identify such specific skill level; rather, we aim to identify a worker’s “total skill level”. 
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where N
j
, N
M
, and N
O
 are the number of workers in prefecture j, MAs, and non-MAs, respectively. 
  
2.4  Skill difference by residence 
 Let I
M
 and I
O
 be the set of workers residing in MAs and non-MAs. Assigning workers to their 
residential prefectures, we calculate the skill difference by residence. Formally, we calculate 
following measure as the skill difference: 
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Positive DRS implies positive sorting that highly skilled workers concentrate in highly productive 
regions. 
 
2.5 Skill difference by hometown 
Our hypothesis is that migration is a major source of spatial skill disparities. A migrant is a 
person who resides in a different region from his/her hometown. We analyze how migration changes 
the geographical distribution of worker skills. For this, we consider the counterfactual skill 
distribution that is obtained when all workers reside in their hometowns. We compute the skill 
difference for this counterfactual skill distribution, referred to as the skill difference by hometown 
and denoted by DHS. Then, we compare it with actual sorting, measured by DRS. The difference 
between these two measures represents the effect of migration on skill sorting.  
Formally, we first assign worker i's skill to either MAs or non-MAs based on his/her hometown 
h(i). Let  and  be the set of workers whose hometowns are included in MAs and non-MAs, 
respectively.  and  denote the numbers of workers in  and , respectively. Then, we 
calculate DHS, defined as 
             1
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If DHS is smaller than DRS, migration has a positive effect on spatial skill disparities. 
 
2.6  Difference in the counterfactual wage without migration 
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Finally, we evaluate the contribution of migration to the spatial wage disparity. The effect of 
migration measured by DRS - DHS, based on the comparison between MAs and non-MAs, cannot be 
directly compared with the actual wage difference because actual wages involve the regional effects 
identified at the prefecture level. For a direct comparison with actual wage difference, we must 
calculate the difference in the wage earned by each worker in his/her hometown, which is called 
counterfactual wage in hometown, using the productivity in the hometown prefecture and the worker 
skill. 
Formally, the counterfactual wage in the hometown is derived by replacing the productivity of 
the residential region in Equation (2) with that of the hometown. Hence, the counterfactual wage of 
worker i, denoted by = w (h(i), si), is defined by 
                ,     (6) 
where  is the regional productivity of hometown prefecture h(i). 
We compare the mean counterfactual wage in MAs and that in non-MAs. The difference in the 
counterfactual wage, DHW, is formulated as 
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where I(j) = {i | h(i) = j} and  is the number of workers whose hometown is prefecture j. In this 
equation, we use prefectural weight based on the number of residents, but not the number of natives, 
to keep the prefectural weights identical to those in the other measures of disparities.
9
  
Table 1 summarizes the measures of spatial disparities analyzed in this paper. These measures 
are characterized by the designation of regional effects and skill distribution. 
 
 
Table 1 Measures of spatial disparities 
 
Regional effect Skill distribution 
Wage difference: DW actual  actual   
Regional productivity difference: DP actual national average 
Skill difference by residence: DRS national average  actual 
Skill difference by hometown: DHS  national average counterfactual (hometown) 
Counterfactual wage difference: DHW  actual counterfactual (hometown) 
                                                        
9 There are disparities in regional productivity among prefectures included in non-MAs. If we use regional weights 
based on the number of natives, we lower the weights for highly productive prefectures in non-MAs that gain 
migrants from the other non-MA prefectures. To exclude the effect of such migration unrelated to the difference 
between MAs and non-MAs, we use the same weights as the other measures of disparities. 
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3.  Data 
We use Japan General Social Surveys (JGSS) designed and carried out by the JGSS Research 
Center at the Osaka University of Commerce, which are individual-level surveys on economics and 
sociology. The surveys were carried out from 2000 to 2010. In this paper, we use surveys in 2002, 
2003, 2005, 2006, 2008, and 2010 that include information required for our analyses.  
The surveys ask about the prefectures of the present residence and the residence at age 15. We 
refer to the latter prefecture as “hometown”. A migrant is defined as an individual whose present 
residence is different from his/her hometown. This definition is based on the concept of long-term 
migration.
10
 Nearly all self-selecting migrations occur after age 15, and hometowns are exogenously 
determined by their parents’ location choices. Although we cannot describe a situation without 
migration using the pre-migration locations identified by the panel data, we can do so using 
information on long-term migration extracted from the JGSS data.
11
 We cannot capture migration 
within the prefecture from this dataset. However, intra-prefectural migration is not important for 
analyzing the effect of migration on the spatial disparities between MAs and non-MAs. 
We limit the sample to workers aged 20-59. To exclude the effect of workers with low working 
incentive, we trim the lowest 10% workers in terms of working hours, which corresponds to 
approximately 20 hours per week. Further, because we limit our attention to salary only, we exclude 
self-employers and workers with a similar status, whose income may contain profits from their 
businesses.
12
  
Table 2 shows the sample statistics for the main variables. The share of regular employees is 
larger than that obtained from the Labor Force Surveys of 2008, which is due to the exclusion of 
workers with the lower tail of working hours. The surveys report the income from the respondents’ 
main job during the previous year.
13
 It also reports the hours of work during the previous week. 
Using these data, we calculate the wage per hour, which is the dependent variable in the wage 
equation estimation.  
Before the analyses, we calculate the spatial wage disparities simply from row data. Table 3 
reports the wage disparity between MAs and non-MAs. Depending on the definition of MAs, the 
disparity ranges from 22.4% to 23.5%. These values are comparable to the values obtained from 
prefectural accounting: hence, the data reflect the overall aspect of the regional structure in Japan. 
                                                        
10 Ohta (2007) estimates the wage equation using a Japanese dataset with information on respondents’ hometown, 
which is similar to the JGSS data. He classifies workers into four groups using combinations of residences and 
hometowns. However, because he does not identify worker skills using residential prefecture dummy variables in 
the wage estimation, the features of the spatial skill difference are ambiguous in his analysis.  
11 Migration identified as a move during an interval of surveys in panel data cannot generate the full effect of 
migration because “stayers” might have originated from another region before the time of the surveys. Therefore, we 
cannot investigate the total effect of migration using such data.   
12 For example, we exclude farmers, doctors, artists, and chief executives. 
13 In the surveys, a respondent chooses his/her annual income among several classes. We use the median values of 
the intervals. For the highest income class over 23 million yen, we cannot assign a median value. Because the 
reduction of a high-income class leads to underestimates for wages in large cities, we compute the expected values of 
income class in each prefecture by assuming Pareto distributions for high-income classes. 
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Table 2  Sample statistics 
 Male Graduation Regular Migration Age Wage (yen/hour) 
Mean 0.588 0.272 0.744 0.211 44.5 1850 
Standard deviation  0.492 0.445 0.436 0.408 11.0 1385 
Note: See the Appendix for detailed definitions of the variables. 
 
 
Table 3 Wage difference between MAs and non-MAs 
Definition of MAs JGSS 2010 Prefectural Accounting 
Tokyo MA 0.235 0.230 
Three Major MAs 0.226 0.209 
Denser Prefectures 0.224 0.198 
 
 
Table 4 Average wage by residence and hometown 
 Tokyo MA (hometown)  Other regions (hometown) 
Tokyo MA (residence) 2098 (1054) 2304 (536) 
Other regions (residence) 1820 (122) 1754 (5200) 
Note: Unit is yen/hour. The number of observations is in parentheses.  
 
 
Table 4 shows the mean wage in the Tokyo MA and others by residence and hometown. Among 
Tokyo residents, migrants receive higher wages than Tokyo natives. Similarly, among residents in 
the other regions, migrants from Tokyo receive higher wages than workers from non-Tokyo areas. 
These data suggest a positive migration selection. However, because wage level depends on regional 
productivity, we must abstract regional effects and worker skills by estimating the wage equation. 
The effect of migration also depends on the volume of migration between MAs and non-MAs. The 
number of observations is shown in parentheses. The inflow to Tokyo is approximately five times 
larger than the outflow from Tokyo (536 vs. 122). If there is a positive selection of migration, it 
contributes to the expansion of the spatial disparity.  
 
 
4  Results 
4.1  Wage equation estimation 
With regard to the determinants of worker skill, we use four categories of variables. The first 
category consists of the standard worker characteristics: a male dummy variable, a college graduate 
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dummy variable, a logarithm of age, and the interaction terms between the former two and the 
logarithm of age. The second category is composed of workplace characteristics, such as 
employment status, the worker’s industry, and the employment size classification of the organization 
to which the worker belongs. Among them, the regular employment dummy variable is important in 
the analysis. We account for the interaction term between the regular employment dummy variable 
and the logarithm of age. The third category is the household information that may represent the 
worker’s unobservable skills or affect the worker’s working incentive. For this consideration, we use 
a dependent spouse dummy variable with a value of one if the worker has a dependent spouse and 
zero otherwise, a dependent child dummy variable with a value of one if he/she has a dependent 
child and zero otherwise, and a dependent dummy variable with a value of one if the main income 
source of the household is not the respondent’s income and zero otherwise.
14
 The fourth category 
includes hometown dummy variables to account for possible heterogeneities in the hometown 
environment that affect unobservable skills. We also include year fixed effects. Detailed definitions 
of the variables are provided in the Appendix. 
The ordinary least-squares estimation results are shown in Column 1 of Table 5. The purpose of 
this estimation is to decompose wages into worker effects and residential prefecture effects. In this 
sense, we do not have considerable interest in each point estimate of the coefficient. By using the 
estimation results, we calculate worker skills and the indices of spatial disparities. 
 
4.2  Regional productivity difference 
If there is positive spatial skill sorting, the observed actual wage difference overstates the 
regional productivity advantage in MAs. This section explores the pure regional productivity 
difference by controlling for skill heterogeneity.  
Figure 1 is the scatterplot between the logarithm of average wage and the logarithm of regional 
productivity for all 47 prefectures in Japan. For the comparison with wage, we adjust the regional 
productivity in prefecture j to the wage of the worker who lives in prefecture j and has an average 
skill level of Japanese workers. This operation can be described by the following equation: 
                 ,     (8) 
where  is the productivity in prefecture j and  is the average skill level of Japanese workers. 
In the calculation, we normalize worker skills to the 2010 values using the estimated year effects. 
The positively sloped line in Figure 1 is the fitted line with a gradient of 0.601. A gradient of less 
than one implies that the prefectural productivity difference is smaller than the actual wage 
                                                        
14 If there is another main income source of the household, the worker’s working incentive will be smaller. If the 
worker has non-regular employment and if his/her spouse has regular employment, the working incentive will be 
considerably smaller. To consider this effect, we include a dummy variable with a value of one if the worker is in the 
above status and zero otherwise.  
Sβw j
j ~~ln 1 
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difference.
  
 
 
Table 5  Wage estimation results 
Dependent variable: ln(wage) (1)  (2)  (3) 
Male -0.655** -0.644** -0.620** 
 
(0.196) (0.220) (0.221) 
College graduates -0.743** -0.574** -0.637** 
 
(0.210) (0.229) (0.232) 
Junior and technical college graduates 0.110** 0.0924** 0.0900** 
 
(0.0181) (0.0198) (0.0199) 
Regular employment 0.367 0.481* 0.482* 
 (0.251) (0.286) (0.289) 
ln(age) 0.185** 0.202** 0.230** 
 
(0.0535) (0.0611) (0.0623) 
Male×ln(age) 0.250** 0.248** 0.241** 
 
(0.0531) (0.0595) (0.0596) 
College graduates×ln(age) 0.231** 0.183** 0.197** 
 
(0.0567) (0.0619) (0.0626) 
Regular employment×ln(age) 0.00396 -0.0355 -0.0360 
 
(0.0636) (0.0731) (0.0737) 
Household variables Yes Yes Yes 
Residential prefecture  Yes Yes Yes 
Hometown prefecture Yes Yes Yes 
Workplace characteristics Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Urban experience No Yes Yes 
Migration variables No No Yes 
Constant -3.060** -2.980** -3.117** 
 
(0.265) (0.311) (0.329) 
Observations 6912 5665 5665 
Adjusted R-squared 0.544 0.538 0.538 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.  
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Figure 1  Actual wage and regional productivity 
 
 
Table 6 Disparities in regional productivity and worker skills 
Definition of MAs (1) DW (2) DP (3) DRS (4) DHS (5) DHW 
Tokyo MA 0.234 0.120 0. 097 0.042 0.189 
Three major MAs 0.227 0.126 0. 083 0.049 0.186 
Denser prefectures 0.223 0.111 0.092 0.058 0.182 
Note: Calculated by the results in Column 1 of Table 5. Wages and skills are normalized to the 2010 values by year 
fixed effects. Hence, DW is not equal to the wage difference in Table 2. DW, DP, DRS, DHS, and DHW represent the 
actual wage disparity, regional productivity difference, skill difference by residence, and skill difference by 
hometown, respectively (see Table 1).  
 
 
The calculated indices of spatial disparities defined in Table 1 are shown in Table 6. The 
productivity difference DP, defined by Equation (4), between the Tokyo MA and the other regions is 
12.0%, which corresponds to 51% of the wage difference. We obtain similar results by using the 
three major MAs (55%) and denser prefectures (50%) as definitions of MAs. These results are 
quantitatively similar to the findings by Combes et al. (2008). Our result also supports the 
implication of Combes et al. (2008) that one would overestimate the regional productivity advantage 
in large cities using observed wages without considering sorting effects. 
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(a) Actual wage 
 
 
(b) Skill by residence 
Figure 2 Cumulative distributions of wage and skill in the Tokyo MA and other regions  
 
 
4.3 Skill difference by residence  
Section 4.2 demonstrates the importance of considering the sorting effects on spatial wage 
disparities, so we inspect the skill disparities formally using the estimated skills. Figure 2 shows the 
cumulative distributions of (a) the actual wage and (b) the estimated skill of the resident. The dashed 
and solid lines represent the cumulative distribution in the Tokyo MA and that in the other regions, 
respectively. For the comparison of the actual wage, we adjust the worker skill using the following 
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equation: 
              ,     (9) 
where  is the adjustment term that equalizes the national average skill to the national average 
actual wage in Japan. Thus,  is interpreted as worker 𝑖’s wage when he/she lives in the region 
that has average regional productivity in Japan.  
Figure 2b illustrates that the Tokyo MA tends to have more highly skilled workers than other 
regions, i.e., there is a spatial skill disparity. In comparing Figures 2a and 2b, however, the disparity 
in worker skill appears smaller than that in the actual wage.  
As shown in Table 6, the skill difference by residence between the Tokyo MA and the other 
regions is 9.7%, implying positive spatial sorting. This positive sorting can be found in other 
definitions of MAs, including the three major MAs (8.3%) and denser prefectures (9.2%).
15
 
 
4.4 Sorting effect of migration 
In Section 4.3, we find positive sorting that highly skilled workers are concentrated in MAs. 
This section investigates the role of migration in spatial skill sorting by calculating the prefectural 
mean skills by assigning workers to their hometowns. That is, we calculate the wages in the 
counterfactual situation wherein migrants had stayed in their hometowns. Figure 3 depicts the 
cumulative distribution of skill in the counterfactual situation. As in the case with Figure 2, the 
dashed and solid lines correspond to the Tokyo MA and other regions. The difference between the 
two lines is considerably smaller than in the case of the resident skills shown in Figure 2b.  
To evaluate the effect of migration, we calculate the skill difference by hometown, DHS. As 
shown in Table 6 (Column 4), the DHS between the Tokyo MA and the other regions is 4.2%, which 
is smaller than the skill difference by residence (9.7%). Thus, migration increases the skill disparity 
by 5.5 percentage points. This finding is robust to the other definitions of MAs. Migration increases 
the skill disparity by 3.4 percentage points using the three major MAs and denser prefectures.
16
 
                                                        
15 Assuming that the population distribution of worker skill is a log-normal distribution, we derive the 95% 
confidence intervals of the skill difference to be [4.2%, 14.7%], [4.3%, 13.0%], and [5.0%, 13.7%] using the Tokyo 
MA, the three major MAs and denser prefectures as a definitions of MAs, respectively. In all cases, the confidence 
interval ranges to the positive region, and hence, the null hypothesis of zero difference is rejected.  
16 Similar to the skill differences by residence, we calculate the 95% confidence intervals for these values. The 
confidence intervals go down ([-1.5%, 9.6%] for the Tokyo MA vs. other regions; [1.2%, 9.8%] for the three major 
MAs vs. other regions; [1.7%, 10.2%] for denser prefectures vs. other regions). We cannot reject the null hypothesis 
of zero difference for Tokyo vs. other regions.  
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Figure 3  Cumulative distribution of skill at hometown 
 
 
Table 7  Average skill by residence and hometown 
 Tokyo MA (hometown) Other regions (hometown) Total 
Tokyo MA (residence) 1603 1755 1654 
Other regions (residence) 1527 1507 1508 
Total 1595 1531 1542 
Note: Skill is defined by Equation (9). Unit is yen/hour. 
 
 
Table 7 compares four categories of workers classified by the combination of hometown and 
residential regions. Workers in the Tokyo MA from the other regions have the highest skills on 
average (1,755 yen per hour). This suggests that the migration of highly skilled workers from 
non-MAs to MAs plays a major role in the sorting effect of migration.
17
 Among the residents 
outside Tokyo, migrants from Tokyo have higher skills (1,527 yen per hour) than do natives (1,507 
yen per hour). This implies that migrants from Tokyo increase the average skill in the other regions. 
However, because the skills of migrants from Tokyo are lower than the stayers in Tokyo, the outflow 
                                                        
17 There is no information on the timing of migration in our dataset. However, there was a large young worker 
migration flow from rural to large MAs in Japan in the 1960s (Tabuchi, 1988; Fujita and Tabuchi, 1997). The 
migrants in the 1960s are now senior workers and earn higher wages than the younger workers. Then, the estimated 
high skill levels of migrants into Tokyo in Table 7 may reflect the cohort effects of the large share of senior workers 
who migrated from rural regions in the 1960s. Thus, we compare the average age of migrant and native residents in 
Tokyo. The average age of the migrants from outside Tokyo is 46.5, whereas the average age of the Tokyo MA 
natives is 42.8. However, our wage estimation results suggest that this difference causes only 2.2% of the skill 
differences for high school graduate male workers, which is quite smaller than the skill difference observed in Table 7. 
This implies that the estimated skill level difference between migrants and natives cannot be explained solely by the 
cohort effect. 
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from Tokyo increases the average skill level in Tokyo. As a result, migration causes large skill 
disparities.
18
 
Figure 4 illustrates the aspect of skill disparities at the prefecture level. It shows the relationship 
between the logarithm of mean skill level at the place of residence (horizontal axis) and at the 
hometown (vertical axis). The positively sloped line is the fitted line with a gradient of 0.837. This 
means that the variability in the prefectural mean skills in the actual situation (with migration) is 
larger than that in the counterfactual situation, where all workers work in their hometowns (without 
migration).  
To evaluate the distribution of prefectural mean skills, rather than the dichotomy, we focus on 
quartiles. Because we have only 47 prefectures, the quartiles are highly sensitive to the estimation 
errors. Thus, we use the expectations of the prefectural mean skills at the hometown on the fitted line. 
Whereas the difference in skills at the place of residence between the maximum and minimum is 
62.8%, it is estimated to be 50.4% at the hometown. This means that migration increases the skill 
difference by 24.8%. Between the third and first quartiles, we find a 14.4% difference in skill level at 
residence and 11.9% in skill level at the hometown. The effect of migration on the skill level 
difference is 20.9% in this case. Thus, migration increases the skill level disparities between 
prefectures by at least 20.9%. 
 
 
 
Figure 4  Skill by residence vs. skill by hometown 
 
                                                        
18 The sorting effect of migration becomes higher in the case of the Tokyo MA because the Tokyo MA absorbs highly 
skilled workers from the Osaka and Nagoya MAs. The mean skill of migrants from Osaka and Nagoya is 1,933, 
which is considerably higher than that of average migrants.  
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Figure 5 Net migration rate and skill growth rate 
 
 
Figure 5 shows the relationship between net-migration inflow and the sorting effect of 
migration. The horizontal axis is the inflow minus the outflow divided by the number of natives. The 
vertical axis is the ratio of mean skill level at the place of residence and at the hometown, which 
illustrates the degree to which the prefectural mean skill level is raised by migration. We find a 
positive relationship between these two variables, which suggests that the effect of highly skilled 
migrants between prefectures dominates that of low-skilled migrants. The migration inflows 
(outflows) of highly skilled workers increase (decrease) the prefectural mean skill level. Because 
highly productive prefectures tend to attract more migrant inflow, migration is the major source of 
disparities in spatial skill level. 
 
4.5 Counterfactual wage in hometown 
For the direct comparison of the sorting effect of migration and the actual wage disparity, in this 
section, we calculate the counterfactual wage difference, DHW, defined by Equation (7). As illustrated 
by Table 6 (Column 5), the counterfactual wage difference is 18.9% between the Tokyo MA and the 
other regions. Migration increases the wage disparity from 18.9% to 23.4% (DW). Hence, the 
contribution of migration to the spatial wage disparity is 23.5% [(23.4-18.6)/18.6]. We obtain nearly 
the same values for the effect of migration using the three major MAs (22.0%) and denser 
prefectures (22.5%). Thus, migration has a non-negligible effect on spatial wage disparity in Japan. 
 
 
5.  Robustness  
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5.1 Human capital accumulation in large MAs 
    The regional effects identified in Section 4.2 are the effects that change the wages of workers 
instantaneously when they enter the regional labor markets and are called “level effects”. However, 
some studies (e.g., Glaeser, 1999; Glaeser and Mere, 2001; Gould, 2007; Yankow, 2007; Glaeser and 
Resseger, 2010; Baum-Snow and Pavan, 2012) point out that working experiences in urban 
environments raise the workers’ speed of human capital accumulation. Such effects are called 
“growth effects”. In this paper, regional productivities are estimated as prefectural fixed effects 
based on the average urban experience of the workers. We are interested in identifying workers’ 
potential skills, which are independent of the residential environment, rather than the skills that are 
obtained by living in urban environments. Urban growth effects may lead to underestimates of the 
potential skills of migrants, given that migrants from rural areas tend to have less urban experience. 
    To control for the skills accumulated in large cities, we introduce the variables defined by using 
the information on “years living in the present region of residence” available in our dataset. The 
estimated equation is redefined as 
                       ,       (10) 
where ui is a vector of years living in the present residence of the Tokyo, Osaka, and Nagoya MAs.
19
  
The estimation results are shown in Column 2 in Table 5. Using the results of this estimation, 
we calculate the potential worker skills defined by 
, 
which is the same as that used before. The growth effect, , includes the region effect but not the 
worker effect. Table 8 reports the calculated skill differences. The disparities tend to be higher 
between the Tokyo MA and the other regions. The effect of migration, DRS-DHS, is 0.066, which is 
slightly higher than the baseline result (0.055). The results are almost the same as the corresponding 
baseline results when using the other definitions of MAs. 
     
 
Table 8  Skill differences by residence and hometown: controlling for urban experiences 
 Definition of MAs (1) DW (2) DRS (3) DHS 
Tokyo MA 0.257 0.127 0.061 
Three major MAs 0.238 0.087 0.049 
Denser prefectures 0.234 0.092 0.051 
Note: Because region effects depend on the workers’ urban experiences, the productivity difference is reduced in this 
table and Table 9. 
                                                        
19 The JGSS include information on years of residence in the present location; hence, ui has at most one positive 
element. The survey in 2002 does not report this information and is thus excluded from the analysis. 
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If the growth effects were caught up in the baseline skill disparities, when controlling them, we 
should have lower values of the disparities in Table 8. However, we obtain rather high values, 
especially for the Tokyo MA. Hence, we do not find solid evidence for growth effects. 
 
5.2 Unobserved skills and the self-selection of migration 
Another concern of the wage estimation is the self-selection of migration. Workers choose their 
residence by comparing the wages and costs of living between the potential residential regions and 
their hometowns. Furthermore, their potential wage will depend on their skills (observed and 
unobserved). For example, workers with high unobserved skills may have more opportunities to 
obtain new jobs with higher wages outside their hometowns. Workers with low unobserved skills 
may have fewer employment opportunities, which forces them to search for jobs outside their 
hometowns. Hence, there should be a difference in the distribution of unobserved skills between 
migrants and stayers. Unobserved skills may be unevenly distributed between MAs and non-MAs 
because of the different share of migrants. That is, even if we fully utilize observed worker 
characteristics, the unobservable heterogeneity correlating to the migration choice will remain and 
cause bias in the estimates of worker skills.  
To account for the unobservable skills revealed by migration behaviors, we include migration 
variables in the wage equation and reestimate it. As for migration variables, we include a migration 
dummy variable that has a value of one if the worker’s residential prefecture is different from his/her 
hometown and zero otherwise. In a case where migration distance affects the degree of self-selection, 
we use the logarithm of distance between the hometown and residential prefectures.
20
 Considering 
the heterogeneity in migration behavior, noted by Greenwood (1975) and Deteng-Dessendre et al. 
(2004), we include the interaction terms of migration dummy variable and logarithm of distance with 
dummy variables for male, college graduate, and regular employment and the logarithm of age (see 
the Appendix). We estimate the following wage equation: 
                      ,       (11) 
where mi is the vector of the migration variables. The worker skill level analyzed here is defined by 
. 
Because migration variables represent the worker’s unobservable skill,  is the component of 
                                                        
20 Workers migrate if and only if they have larger gains than the cost of migration. Migration requires several types 
of costs, such as moving costs, searching costs for job and housing, and non-monetary costs from the differences in 
the cultures and natural environments. These monetary and non-monetary costs will correlate with the migration 
distance. We measure the great circle distances between the prefectural offices. We assign zero to distances between 
prefectures within the Tokyo and Osaka MAs. Because a non-negligible number of workers commute across 
prefectures in these MAs, migration within these MAs may be only a residential move, not a change of workplace. 
We are not concerned with such migration unrelated to worker skills. We add one to distance to avoid a logarithm of 
zero distance. 
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the worker’s skill. The results are shown in Column 3 of Table 5. 
Table 9 reports the calculated skill disparities. Although introducing migration variables 
changes the value of the skill disparities, DRS-DHS is nearly the same as the baseline. Therefore, we 
confirm the robustness of our result that migration plays significant roles in spatial skill disparities.  
 
 
Table 9 Skill differences: considering the self-selection of migration 
Definition of MAs (1) DW (2) DRS (3) DHS 
Tokyo MA 0.257 0.125 0.059 
Three major MAs 0.238 0.075 0.037 
Denser prefectures 0.234 0.082 0.042 
 
 
 
6  Further results: types of migrants 
Migration behavior would differ among the worker characteristics. Thus, the sorting effect of 
migration would be heterogeneous among them. We investigate the sorting effects of migration for 
each of following three subgroups of workers: female, low-educated, and non-regular employee 
groups. For analyses, we use the baseline estimation to maintain the sample size (see footnote 19).  
Table 10 shows the mean skills of female workers by residence and hometown in the same 
manner as Table 7 for all workers. Workers in Tokyo from other regions have the highest skill level. 
However, there is nearly no difference between the migrants and natives residing in Tokyo. Migrants 
from Tokyo have the lowest average skill level, which strongly contrasts the results of sorting 
workers as a whole. The positive selection of migration from non-MAs along with the negative 
selection from Tokyo generates skill disparities similar to those in all workers: DRS =9.4% and DHS 
=4.4%. The migration inflow of female workers to MAs itself has a negative effect on spatial 
disparity because female workers have lower skills than males on average. 
 
 
Table 10 Average skill level by residence and hometown: female workers 
 Tokyo MA (hometown) Other regions (hometown) Total 
Tokyo MA (residence) 1064 1076 1068 
Other regions (residence) 791 981 976 
Total 1033 989 997 
Note: The skill level is defined by Equation (9). Unit is yen/hour. 
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Table 11 Average skill level by residence and hometown: low-educated workers 
 Tokyo MA (hometown) Other regions (hometown) Total 
Tokyo MA (residence) 1353 1355 1354 
Other regions (residence) 1163 1351 1348 
Total 1333 1352 1349 
Note: The skill is defined by Equation (9). Unit is yen/hour. 
 
 
Table 12 Average skill level by residence and hometown: non-regular employees 
 Tokyo MA (hometown) Other regions (hometown) Total 
Tokyo MA (residence) 831 787 816 
Other regions (residence) 724 802 800 
Total 817 801 804 
Note: The skill is defined by Equation (9). Unit is yen/hour. 
 
 
Tables 11 reports the mean skill levels of low-educated workers. Focusing on the residents in 
the Tokyo MA, there is a negligible difference between migrants and natives. Among residents 
outside Tokyo, migrants from Tokyo tend to have lower skill levels than natives. Interestingly, the 
mean skill levels by hometown are lower in Tokyo (1,333 vs. 1,352), implying a negative DHS. This 
may reflect a higher college enrollment rate in Tokyo. Because high school graduates in Tokyo with 
high potential skill levels enroll in college, highly skilled workers are rare in the low-educated 
group.  
    Table 12 shows the skill differences among non-regular employees. The results are quite 
different from those of all workers. Migrants, regardless of their source regions, have lower skills 
than stayers in the hometowns; i.e., migration is negative selection. Because low-skilled workers 
tend to be unemployed, they tend to migrate to search for better employment opportunities. As a 
result, DRS and DHS have nearly the same value (2.04% and 2.06%, respectively). 
    To summarize the above analyses, we do not find a greater effect of positive selection of 
migration among low-skill workers. Spatial skill disparities tend to become lower for low-skill 
workers, indicating that most of the sorting effects of migration originate from highly educated and 
regularly employed male workers. 
 
 
7  Concluding remarks 
We have analyzed spatial skill sorting using Japanese individual-level data. By estimating the 
 22 
wage equation, we have identified workers’ skills and regional productivity. Using the estimation 
results, first, we have shown that observed wage differences overstate the difference in regional 
productivity. This implies that spatial sorting is important in analyzing regional economic 
inequalities. Second, to determine these sorting effects, we have compared the skill distributions of 
workers between MAs and non-MAs. Workers in MAs have 8.3% to 9.7% higher skill levels on 
average than those in non-MAs depending on the definition of MAs. These findings suggest that the 
observed mean wages in MAs are increased by spatial skill sorting. Third, we have quantified the 
effect of migration on the skill sorting based on the comparison between the actual skill distribution 
and the counterfactual skill distribution without migration. Migration increases the spatial skill 
difference by 3.4 to 5.5 percentage points. These effects of migration correspond to a 22.0% to 
23.5% increase in wage differences depending on the definition of MAs. Hence, migration plays 
significant role in spatial wage disparities in Japan. 
We have also investigated how the aspect of sorting differs across worker characteristics. For 
female workers, migrants from MAs tend to have lower skills than natives residing in non-MAs. For 
low-educated workers, we have not observed positive skill sorting in term of workers’ hometown. 
Among non-regular employees, migration is negative selection. These findings demonstrate that 
most of the sorting effects of migration originate from highly educated and regularly employed male 
workers. 
 
 
Appendix  List of variables 
Prefecture effects 
(1) Residential prefecture dummy variables: Dummies for prefectures of present residences. There 
are 47 prefectures in Japan. 
 
Standard worker characteristics 
(2) Male dummy variable. 
(3) College graduate dummy variable: a dummy variable for workers with a college degree. 
(4) Junior and technical college dummy variable: a dummy variable for workers who graduated 
junior or technical college but without a college degree. 
(5) Logarithm of age. 
(6) Interaction terms: (2) and (5); (3) and (5). 
 
Workplace characteristics 
(7) Regular employment dummy variable: a dummy variable that has a value of one for a regular 
employee and zero for a non-regular employee. 
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(8) Employment status dummy variables: We have 6 categories of employment status for regular 
employees, i.e., no title, foreman, assistant manager, manager, department chief, and other. 
(9) Industry dummy variables: dummy variables for industries where the worker is employed. We 
have 17 industry classifications. 
(10) Employment size classifications: dummy variables of classification of the size of the 
organization where the worker is employed. We define 3 categories for employment size: one to 
99, 100 to 999, and over 999. 
(11) Multiple establishment dummy variable: This takes on a value of one if the organization where 
the worker is employed has multiple establishments and zero otherwise. 
(12) Interaction terms: (6) and (7); (8) and (10); (9) and (10). 
 
Household characteristics 
(13) Dependent spouse dummy variable: This takes on a value of one if the worker has a dependent 
spouse and zero otherwise. 
(14) Dependent child dummy variable: This takes on a value of one if he/she has a dependent child 
and zero otherwise. 
(15) Dependent dummy variable: This takes on a value of one if the respondent’s income is not the 
main income source of the household and zero otherwise. 
(16) Interaction term: (6) and (15). 
 
Hometown dummy variables 
(17) Hometown dummy variables: dummy variables for prefectures where the workers resided at 
age 15. 
 
Urban experiences 
(18) Logarithm of residential years in the Tokyo MA: logarithm of years of residence in the Tokyo 
MA if the present residential location is in the Tokyo MA and zero otherwise. 
(19) Logarithm of residential years in the Osaka MA: logarithm of years of residence in the Osaka 
MA if the present residential location is in the Osaka MA and zero otherwise. 
(20) Logarithm of residential years in the Nagoya MA: logarithm of years of residence in the 
Nagoya MA if the present residential location is in the Nagoya MA and zero otherwise. 
 
Migration variables 
(21) Migration dummy variable: This takes on a value of one if the prefecture of present residence 
is different from that of the prefecture at age 15 and zero otherwise. 
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(22) Logarithm of migration distance: logarithm of the distance between the prefectural offices of 
the present residence and the hometown. To avoid a logarithm of zero, we add one to distances. 
(23) Interaction terms: (2) and (21); (2) and (22); (3) and (21); (3) and (22); (5) and (21); (5) and 
(22); (6) and (21); (6) and (22). 
 
Year effects 
(24) Survey year dummy variables. 
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